Rocky Mountain Gun

As for Ms. Garcia, he determined that she could not show a credible threat of prosecution, which was necessary for her to have standing to challenge the Act before it took effect. Id. at *4. [...] She has shown an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to implementation of the Act and that would likely be redressed by a favorable decision here. [...] It is the movant's burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that these factors weigh in favor of an injunction. [...] The Governor is correct that, because Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a law that is in effect, the injunction they seek would disrupt the status quo and is thus disfavored. [...] So, putting all the pieces together, the Court found that the text of the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592, 128 S. Ct. 2783. [...] Still, Plaintiffs attempt to equate the words “obtain” and “possess.” Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. [...] Plaintiffs point to a handful of cases they claim support their argument that the purchase of a firearm is covered by the Second Amendment. [...] at 2130 n.6 *10 The record presently in front of me conclusively shows that the plain text of the Second Amendment does not cover the conduct at issue, and consequently, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. 2. [...] The Governor emphasizes that waiting-period laws were unnecessary before the early twentieth century “because a waiting period inherent in the acquisition of firearms already existed for many Americans.” Resp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16. [...] Nonetheless, I find the Governor has provided a sufficient record to conclude that our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation is consistent with the Waiting-Period Act.